Research
At the entrance to the museum of communism in Czechia. Image by author.
At the entrance to the museum of communism in Czechia. Image by author.
My research explores how national history and other narratives about one's ingroup relate to modern political attitudes and behavior. How do individuals think about the past, and when does this affect voting behavior or other political attitudes?
Relatedly, some of these histories have led to stigmatized ideologies and parties. In another strand of research, I explore changing stigma around the radical right and some of its consequences.
I explore these questions in democratic settings, with projects in Europe (mainly Spain and Portugal), the United States, and Israel.
My dissertation connects these two phenomena, exploring how attitudes towards authoritarian history are connected to the success of "anti-reformer" parties that continue to be ideologically and symbolically linked to the past regime. It explores the challenge that these parties face in the aftermath of democratic transition and how various opportunities allow them to gain a foothold. It then tests how authoritarian nostalgia -- a perception that things were better under the former regime than under the modern democratic system -- is connected to support and the success of these parties. It outlines how both nostalgia and the success of the parties can mutually reinforce one another. Drawing on survey experiments in Spain and Portugal and cross-national analysis, the project improves our understandings of nostalgia, party politics, and changing social norms.
Working papers/under review/R&R
Abstract: This study conducts a meta-analysis of the relationship between collective victimhood beliefs and conflict-related attitudes. Examining 745 estimates from 103 articles, we assess the relationship between collective victimhood beliefs and hawkishness, reconciliation (attitudes towards current or former adversaries), out-group exclusion (attitudes towards groups with which one is not in direct conflict), and in-group attachment. While we find an aggregate positive association between collective victimhood beliefs and conflict-related attitudes, there is an important distinction between non-inclusive and inclusive forms of collective victimhood: non-inclusive collective victimhood beliefs are associated with greater conflict-related attitudes, whereas inclusive collective victimhood beliefs generally have opposing effects. These results are consistent across a wide range of geographic contexts, types of conflict experiences, and identities. They also extend to the association between collective victimhood beliefs and the emotions and cognitive perspectives that are often identified as mediators. Methodologically, although observational and experimental studies reach similar conclusions about the direction of the relationships, experimental studies find consistently smaller effect sizes.
Abstract: Radical-right behavior and support for radical-right parties have increased across many countries in recent decades. A growing body of research has argued that, similar to the spread of other extremist behaviors, this is due to an erosion of political norms. This suggests that re-stigmatizing radical-right parties might be an effective way of countering their growth. We use a survey experiment in Spain that compares the effectiveness of three theory-driven interventions aimed at increasing political stigma against a radical right party. Contrary to expectations, we fail to validate the efficacy of vignette-based attempts at stigmatization, instead identifying some backlash effects. Methodologically, our findings underscore the importance of validating treatments, as we show that simple attempts at re-stigmatization can produce null or opposing effects to their intended purpose. Theoretically, our results support the idea that normalization is a "one-way street", in that re-stigmatizing parties is difficult after a party has become normalized.
Abstract: When are far right parties punished for their extreme positions? We argue that the punishments of deviant position-taking are conditional on the degree to which a far right party is normalized or stigmatized in the party system. When the far right is treated as normal, the costs suffered from these parties’ extreme positions decrease, as moderate voters discount the authenticity of their commitment to such positions. We use a survey experiment to test this argument in Spain, finding evidence for discounting on the far right’s extreme anti-LGBTQ+ statements, but not on its embrace of authoritarian history. This study thus shows that normalization and stigmatization of the far right can change how its extreme positions are interpreted by voters.
Abstract: A significant observational literature identifies a link between collective victimhood and conflict-enhancing attitudes, though results from experimental work increasing victimhood's salience vary. This article thus revisits this question in two studies in a context in which increased salience is especially likely to shift attitudes. Study 1 exploits the happenstance fielding of 12 surveys over Israel's Holocaust Memorial Day between 1979 and 2021. Using all 192 available estimates assessing hawkishness, preferences for out-group exclusion, and in-group solidarity, it fails to detect statistically significant effects of a state-led effort to increase the salience of Israel's collective victimhood narrative in a natural setting 90% of the time. Study 2 replicates the null findings across multiple comparisons and outcomes in a companion harmonized panel and survey experiment. Substantively, the findings suggest that it may be harder to use short-term manipulations of collective victimhood to shift attitudes than often assumed.
Description: In a book chapter on populist reactions to the pandemic and cross-national report on social media communication, both co-authored with Marta Lorimer (LSE), we explore the rhetoric and actions Marine Le Pen and her Rassemblement National (RN) party throughout the COVID-19 Pandemic. In both pieces, we argue that Le Pen and the RN engaged in a careful strategy of balancing respectability and radicalization. The strategy fits well with the party's attempt to 'de-demonize' itself, a choice driven largely by incentives present in the French electoral system.